از زن، زندگی، آزادی تا جنگ ایران در ۲۰۲۶؛ مرگ خامنه‌ای، جانشینی، هرمز و زندگی مردم

1. Dates, evidence and the starting point

For this reason, The social movement behind this period began in September 2022. A new economic and political protest wave began on 28 December 2025, or 7 Dey 1404 in the Iranian calendar, with shop closures in Tehran’s bazaar. The largest street killings occurred on 8 and 9 January 2026, corresponding to 18 and 19 Dey. References to “18 Azar” are inconsistent with the documented timeline and usually reflect a confusion with 18 Dey. The large US–Israeli campaign began on 28 February 2026.

These dates describe connected developments, but they do not form a simple chain of cause and effect. Women’s civil disobedience did not directly trigger an air campaign. The currency crisis did not by itself start the war. The nuclear dispute does not explain every part of Iranian domestic politics. Each development had its own actors, immediate causes and evidentiary record.

Furthermore, In this report, “confirmed” means that the responsible institution and several independent sources have supported the event with names, documents, imagery or other checkable evidence. A “belligerent claim” is information released by Iran, Israel or the United States without sufficient independent confirmation. An estimate remains an estimate until its method and underlying list can be audited.

2. Woman, Life, Freedom

Jina Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Kurdish woman from Saqqez, was detained by Iran’s morality police on 13 September 2022 and died in hospital three days later. The authorities attributed her death to an underlying medical condition. Her family and witnesses rejected that explanation. A United Nations fact-finding mission later concluded that her death in custody was unlawful and documented evidence of killings, torture, sexual violence and arbitrary detention during the repression that followed.

Moreover, Her funeral became a protest. The Kurdish slogan “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” spread across Iran in its Persian form, “Zan, Zendegi, Azadi” — Woman, Life, Freedom. Women removed their headscarves, students and schoolchildren joined demonstrations, and demands expanded from compulsory hijab to equality before the law, accountability, release of prisoners and structural political change.

Street demonstrations declined under repression, but everyday behaviour changed. Many women continued to appear in public without compulsory hijab. The state used cameras, vehicle impoundment, fines, business closures and prosecutions. A harsher hijab statute was suspended, not repealed. Practical freedom expanded in parts of society while the legal instruments of punishment remained available to the authorities.

Therefore, Related books: Václav Havel’s The Power of the Powerless examines how everyday compliance sustains authoritarian rule and how refusal creates political space. Ervand Abrahamian’s A History of Modern Iran places present-day protest in the longer relationship between state, class, religion and social movements.

3. The Shahid Rajaee port explosion

The Shahid Rajaee port explosion occurred on 26 April 2025, ten months before the 2026 war. Fire began in a container area and the blast damaged buildings and windows across a wide radius. The preliminary death toll rose to 70, but Iranian officials revised the final figure to 57 on 4 May after correcting for duplicated counts of human remains. Early reports raised the possibility of ammonium perchlorate or a similar perchlorate compound connected to solid missile propellant. No final official cause was published. Independent visual analysis most strongly supported a chemical-container fire as the starting point.

In addition, No credible public evidence shows that Israel caused the explosion. Ali Khamenei ordered an investigation into negligence or deliberate action. Reliable sources do not record him calling the incident an Israeli “strategic mistake”. The explosion belongs in the broader chronology of vulnerability and poor hazardous-material control, but it should not be labelled the first attack of the 2026 war.

4. December–January protest wave

This new wave began with gatherings and shop closures in Tehran’s bazaar on 28 December. Food inflation, import difficulties and the falling rial shaped the initial demands. Protests moved to universities, neighbourhoods and other cities. Economic slogans quickly merged with demands for political change.

For this reason, The authorities imposed a near-total internet blackout on 8 January. Security forces used live ammunition and pellets at multiple locations that night and on 9 January. Hospitals, cemeteries and families seeking bodies became key sources for documenting names. The blackout obstructed emergency care, communication and casualty counting, and it created ideal conditions for both concealment and unsupported numerical claims.

Arrests continued through January and February. Human-rights organisations documented enforced disappearance, coerced televised confessions, threats of execution and pressure on bereaved families. Large street gatherings became more difficult, but anger over the economy and the killings did not disappear.

5. How many protesters were killed?

Furthermore, The Islamic Republic announced 3,117 deaths and classified some of the dead as state personnel or victims of “terrorism”. Human Rights Activists published a 50-day record containing at least 7,007 verified deaths, with thousands of additional cases under review. Time reported an estimate above 30,000 based on two anonymous Health Ministry officials. Figures between 40,000 and 45,000 circulated widely, but no public name list or auditable counting method had been released for them by 27 July.

Impartial reporting does not mean averaging these figures. The official number should be identified as official, the independently documented minimum should remain a minimum, and a source-based estimate should not be presented as a completed count. The defensible conclusion is that thousands were killed, independent lists exceed the state total, and the final number remains unresolved.

Moreover, Related books: Abrahamian’s Tortured Confessions supplies the institutional history behind coerced public confession. Reza Baraheni’s Chah be Chah conveys the human experience of political imprisonment through literature. Behrouz Boochani’s No Friend but the Mountains explores prolonged detention, uncertainty and powerlessness in a different setting.

6. Washington’s promise of help, Reza Pahlavi and Munich

Donald Trump told protesters in January that help was “on its way”, without defining its operational meaning. Visible measures at that stage included sanctions on officials, tariff threats against buyers of Iranian oil, discussion of satellite connectivity and greater US readiness. The formal objectives later given for the 28 February campaign focused on nuclear, missile, drone and maritime capabilities. The documentary record does not support describing the entire war as a mission to rescue protesters.

Therefore, Senator Lindsey Graham, one of the strongest advocates of pressure and military action, spoke beside Reza Pahlavi at the Munich rally. Graham was alive when this report was published; rumours of his death had no credible evidence.

Reza Pahlavi’s path runs from crown prince under the former monarchy to a full-time opposition figure in exile. He trained as a pilot, remained abroad after the revolution, advocated secular democracy and a referendum, and expanded his network after 2022. “Prince” is a historical dynastic title used by his supporters, not an office under Iran’s current legal order. Supporters call him a transition leader because he is internationally recognised, has an organised network and has presented a transition plan. Critics emphasise that he has not won a national election, does not represent the entire opposition and should face scrutiny over foreign intervention and concentration of authority.

Further context

In addition, The Munich rallies displayed a large monarchist presence alongside other opponents of the Islamic Republic and foreign politicians. Republicans, left-wing organisations, ethnic groups and civil activists disputed any claim that one faction represented the whole opposition. The Lion and Sun flag signifies national continuity for many Pahlavi supporters and recalls monarchy and exclusion for some critics. US and Israeli flags can express gratitude for pressure on the regime, or can blur the boundary between opposition politics, national independence and concern for civilians. No single rally establishes the opinion of “the Iranian people”.

Related books: Andrew Scott Cooper’s The Fall of Heaven, Mohammad Reza Shah’s Answer to History, and Ehsan Naraghi’s From the Shah’s Palace to Evin Prison offer independent research, the ruler’s own defence, and a personal view across both sides of the revolution.

7. From the 2025 twelve-day war to the February talks

For this reason, Direct Iranian–Israeli exchanges in 2024 and the twelve-day war of June 2025 lowered the threshold for force. During the 2025 fighting, Israel and Iran exchanged strikes and the United States attacked Iranian nuclear facilities. The ceasefire left disputes over enrichment, enriched uranium, IAEA inspections, missiles and sanctions unresolved.

For decades, senior officials of the Islamic Republic have spoken of the end of the “Zionist regime”, supported armed anti-Israel organisations and, more recently, conducted direct attacks. Some translations of individual slogans remain contested, but the policy of hostility is well established. That history does not automatically make every preventive strike lawful. Necessity, proportionality and the immediacy of a threat require separate assessment.

Furthermore, Oman hosted or transmitted messages in talks on 6, 22 and 27 February. Enrichment levels and location, inspections, missile limits, sanctions relief and security guarantees were under discussion. Oman reported progress on 27 February. Strikes began less than a day later. Washington said the diplomatic window had closed; Iran and Oman condemned an attack launched while talks were active. No final signed agreement from those February rounds was published.

8. First strikes on 28 February

US and Israeli forces launched coordinated strikes against Tehran, command centres, air defences, missile installations and nuclear-related locations during the first hours of 28 February. That day’s sequence is clear: the US and Israel began the large campaign, and Iran then retaliated against Israel and US-linked bases and facilities in the region. Earlier threats and the 2025 war explain the setting; they do not alter that sequence.

Moreover, The plan struck equipment and senior decision-makers at the same time. The presence of senior officials at security meetings enabled attacks on the command structure. A complex associated with the supreme leader’s office and location was hit in Tehran. The IRGC commander-in-chief, armed forces chief of staff, defence minister, security officials and members of the leadership circle died in the opening wave. The concentration of targets indicates detailed intelligence about location and timing.

9. Senior officials killed during the war

The following list reflects senior deaths confirmed by Iranian state media and multiple independent reports by 27 July. “Air strike” describes the reported event and does not always identify the precise weapon. Where operational detail came solely from the Israeli military, that limitation remains explicit.

Confirmed deaths and reporting limits

Confirmed deaths: continuation

Therefore, Additional senior commanders reported dead included Saleh Asadi, Hossein Jabal Amelian, Reza Mozaffari-Nia, Mohsen Darebaghi, Gholamreza Rezaian and Bahram Hosseini Motlagh on 28 February; Majid ibn al-Reza and Reza Khazaei on 3 March; Majid Hassini, Alireza Bi-Azar, Ahmad Rasouli and Hossein Ahmadlou in a Beirut hotel strike on 8 March; and Abu Dhar Mohammadi on 12 March.

The loss of so many officials created operational gaps and succession contests. It did not automatically collapse the state. The IRGC, army, ministries and parliament appointed replacements and continued functioning. Greater influence moved to a smaller group of surviving commanders, the new leader’s office and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.

10. Ali Khamenei’s death: confirmation and false imagery

In addition, Media close to the government initially said Khamenei was alive and directing the response. Trump then announced his death. Israeli officials also said he had been killed. Iranian state television and the official news agency confirmed the death in the first hours of 1 March. Satellite imagery of heavy destruction, the Iranian announcement, reporting by several independent agencies, the coffin and the official burial form the evidence chain.

A picture purporting to show his body under rubble circulated online. Fact-checkers established that it was fake. Separately, anonymous Israeli sources said a photograph of the body had been shown to Benjamin Netanyahu and Trump. No public, independently authenticated version of that alleged photograph appeared. The claimed private image trail remains an unverified report and is unnecessary to establish the death.

For this reason, The evidence supports a firm conclusion: Ali Khamenei died in the 28 February strike. Initial denial, a delay in state confirmation and one fabricated image do not demonstrate that he survived. A daughter, her 14-month-old child, a son-in-law and Mojtaba Khamenei’s wife, Zahra Haddad-Adel, also died in the attack.

11. Mojtaba Khamenei’s succession and absence

Article 107 of Iran’s constitution assigns selection of the supreme leader to the Assembly of Experts. Article 111 provides for an interim council between a leader’s death and the selection of a successor. The Assembly chose Mojtaba Khamenei on 8 March. He had held no publicly declared elected or senior executive state office, but had long been regarded as close to his father’s office and security network. IRGC support was decisive.

Furthermore, No independently verifiable current photograph, video or voice recording of Mojtaba had appeared by 27 July. His office issued written messages about mourning, war and revenge. Reuters cited senior Tehran sources saying that he had suffered serious facial and limb injuries in the 28 February strike, remained under treatment, and was being concealed to reduce the risk of another attack.

Iranian authorities officially describe him as alive and exercising the office. The absence of audiovisual evidence raises legitimate questions about his health and capacity. It does not prove his death, and no credible evidence established that he had died by the publication date. His selection is formally possible under the constitutional text, which does not prohibit family succession. Politically, critics view the transfer from father to son as evidence of quasi-hereditary rule.

12. Ghalibaf, Zarif and the post-strike balance of power

Moreover, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s career includes senior IRGC command, national police leadership, the Tehran mayoralty and the parliamentary speakership since 2020. The deaths of Shamkhani, Larijani and senior commanders left him as one of the few well-known officials with formal office, security experience and access to indirect negotiations. Reports described him as an increasingly central interlocutor. No constitutional change made him supreme leader or head of government.

Former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif did not sit in the wartime command chain. As the leading Iranian architect of the 2015 nuclear agreement, he proposed ceasefire terms and a diplomatic framework from outside the security leadership. His value lay in diplomatic language and international connections; implementation depended on institutions controlled by the new leader’s office and the IRGC.

13. Missiles, drones and damage on both sides

Therefore, Iran’s response combined short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and one-way attack drones. The Khorramshahr family is designed for regional range and a heavy payload. Shahed-136 drones are slower and cheaper, making them suitable for mass launches. Combining fast missiles with lower-cost drones can overload layered air defence. The United States and Israel used aircraft, guided bombs, cruise missiles, naval platforms and several tiers of interception.

Defences intercepted many projectiles but did not provide complete protection. Residential neighbourhoods, bases and infrastructure in Israel and Gulf states were damaged. The effects included casualties, airport closures, interruption of work, shelter use, anxiety and the financial cost of each interception.

In addition, Related books: Ahmad Mahmoud’s Scorched Earth brings war from maps into the city, home and family. The Adventurous Life of Nader Shah raises a different historical question: how military expansion, taxation and the exhaustion of the state affect Iranian society.

14. Natanz, Pickaxe Mountain and the nuclear file

Natanz has long been central to Iran’s enrichment programme. After earlier damage, Iran developed a deeper underground complex at Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La, often called Pickaxe Mountain, south of Natanz. Its depth, tunnels and restricted inspector access made it one of the hardest potential targets. Satellite images show entrances and construction activity; they do not establish exactly what is stored inside.

For this reason, Trump discussed striking the mountain and the possibility of a limited operation to reach nuclear material. Credible reporting referred to conventional weapons or a limited ground mission. No public evidence showed a decision to use a nuclear weapon. The phrase “nuclear attack” confused an attack on a nuclear-related target with the use of an atomic bomb.

Late-July reporting had not confirmed a strike on Pickaxe Mountain. The location of part of Iran’s enriched-uranium stock and the condition of centrifuges remained uncertain. The IAEA called for inspectors to return and re-establish a material-accounting chain. Claims of “complete destruction” or “complete removal” remained premature without inspection.

15. Bridges, water, communications and civilians

Furthermore, Early targeting concentrated on command, air defence, missiles and nuclear facilities. As the war continued, bridges, communications towers, border crossings, water-pumping stations, desalination facilities and logistics routes were also damaged. The US and Israel described some as dual-use targets supporting troop movement. Critics pointed to interrupted water, transport and emergency services.

July reports included communications towers in Bandar Abbas, water pumping in Khuzestan, the Jask desalination plant, an Iraq border crossing, aerospace sites and the Khojir missile complex. One person was reported killed at the Khuzestan water facility. Damage at Jask disrupted water for roughly 10,000 people. “Infrastructure” therefore means drinking water, hospitals, relief operations and employment as well as physical installations.

Moreover, Under the law of armed conflict, a dual-use object may be attacked only when it makes an effective contribution to military action and its destruction offers a definite military advantage. Proportionality and precautions for civilians continue to apply. Government or communications use alone does not make every strike lawful.

Related books: Martin Henry Donohoe’s Mission to Persia records how foreign competition, weak government, routes and famine converged during the First World War. Barbara Tuchman’s A Distant Mirror examines the combined social effect of war, disease, taxation and institutional mistrust in another century.

16. Gulf states, Turkey, Russia and China

Therefore, After the US strikes, Iran attacked or launched projectiles toward US-linked targets in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar. The United Arab Emirates reported drone incidents, interception and falling debris. Each event requires its own classification: a direct hit, an interception over national territory, debris from another trajectory and an attack on a US base are different events.

Reuters reported, citing two Western and two Iranian officials, that Saudi Arabia carried out covert strikes against Iran in late March. Riyadh did not publicly confirm the report. It is therefore important multi-source reporting, not an official Saudi admission. Saudi Arabia’s publicly acknowledged July strikes were mainly directed at Houthi positions in Yemen.

In addition, Turkey sought to mediate before and during the war, while worrying about displacement and armed activity near its border. Qatar and the UAE balanced the security of US bases, commercial interests and the need to prevent regional escalation. Iraq faced pressure from Iran-aligned groups, Washington and its own claims to sovereignty.

Russia and China condemned the US–Israeli campaign, called for a halt and opposed externally imposed regime change. Russia provided political and technical cooperation, and China remained a key buyer of Iranian oil. Neither entered direct war with the United States. Their strategic partnerships with Tehran did not amount to a collective-defence treaty.

Further context

For this reason, Related books: Stephen Kinzer’s Overthrow follows the unintended consequences of US regime-change operations. Annick Cojean’s Gaddafi’s Harem documents personal violence inside dictatorship and reminds readers that removing a ruler does not automatically repair institutions.

17. Hormuz, oil and the 17 June memorandum

Roughly one-fifth of global petroleum consumption and a large share of liquefied natural-gas exports pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has long treated closure threats as a deterrent. During the 2026 war, inspections, attacks, warnings and sharply reduced traffic disrupted markets. “Closure” often meant an economically effective shutdown caused by insurance risk and company decisions rather than a physical barrier across every lane.

Furthermore, Iran discussed fees or tolls for passage. Limiting traffic raised oil prices and political costs for its adversaries, but prolonged disruption also threatened Iran’s own revenue, Chinese relations, Gulf neighbours and imported supplies. Temporary reopening turned the strait into a negotiable concession.

On 17 June, Pakistan announced that the presidents of Iran and the United States had signed the “Islamabad Memorandum”. Pakistan and Qatar were the principal mediators; Oman subsequently became central to implementing the strait provisions and conducting maritime talks. US officials said an electronic version had been signed earlier and that Trump also signed it that day at Versailles. The World Cup had begun six days earlier, on 11 June, and continued until 19 July. The public announcement therefore fell during the group stage. No evidence shows that the tournament itself determined the timing.

Moreover, The memorandum provided a 60-day pause in attacks, safe passage without charges for 60 days and further talks over future administration of the strait. It was not a final peace treaty. Nuclear inspections, sanctions, missiles and enforcement guarantees remained unsettled.

Further context

Trump influenced oil prices through reserve releases, temporary sales licences, pressure on producers and the safe-passage arrangement. He did not control the market alone. OPEC production, world demand, insurance risk and shipping decisions remained independent forces. EIA daily data show Brent at US$71.32 on 27 February, US$77.24 on 2 March, a peak of US$138.21 on 7 April, US$80.33 on 17 June, US$71.78 on 7 July and US$86.99 on 20 July.

Therefore, Houthi threats raised the risk around Bab el-Mandeb and caused attacks and diversions, but traffic data did not support a complete and lasting closure. Hormuz connects Gulf exports to the open ocean; Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea route to the Gulf of Aden and the Suez system.

18. Ali Khamenei’s funeral and burial

Official funeral events began in early July and lasted about a week. Khamenei’s coffin and the remains of four relatives travelled through Tehran and Qom, then the Iraqi shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala, before reaching Mashhad. State media described crowds in the millions; their exact size could not be independently measured.

In addition, President Masoud Pezeshkian, Ghalibaf, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, commanders and clerics attended. Delegations came from Russia, Pakistan, Taliban-governed Afghanistan, Iraq and dozens of other states. High-level Western representation was largely absent.

Nechirvan Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, attended the official ceremony. The precise description is the participation of the Kurdistan Region’s leadership delegation, not an endorsement by “the Kurds” as a whole. Geography, trade, a shared border and Barzani’s place in the Iraqi delegation offer a stronger explanation than blanket ideological support.

For this reason, The coffin moved through Mashhad on 9 July. A helicopter carried it over the final part of the route because of the crowd. Khamenei’s eldest son, Mostafa, led the prayer. IRNA reported in the early hours of 10 July that burial at the Imam Reza shrine had been completed. Mojtaba Khamenei was not seen at any public stage; three of his brothers appeared.

19. The July return to war

Three merchant ships were attacked on 7 July. Qatar blamed Iran and an initial US assessment also pointed to Iranian fire. Tehran denied responsibility and said the ships had left a coordinated route. The United States treated the incident as a breach, struck more than 80 targets and revoked some oil permissions. Iran accused Washington of earlier violations.

Furthermore, The attack on the ships was the immediate trigger for the large renewed campaign. Responsibility remained disputed in the public record: several governments accused Iran, Iran denied the charge, and no completed independent investigation had been released. Saying that Trump abandoned the agreement without a precipitating event omits important evidence. Saying that Iranian responsibility was conclusively proven also goes beyond the public record.

The July wave included bridges, communications, water facilities, missile sites and border crossings. Supporters argued that such pressure reduced state capability and forced negotiation. Opponents said the burden fell on civilians and could weaken the country without producing accountable political change. Others distinguished between attacks on command or weapons sites and attacks affecting water, bridges and residential areas.

Moreover, Omani mediation produced another pause on 25–26 July. It remained fragile when this report was published. No comprehensive peace instrument settled the strait, nuclear inspections, sanctions and future enforcement.

20. War casualties

The World Health Organization recorded 3,375 deaths in Iran by 9 June. Iran’s Health Ministry announced 3,434 war deaths on 24 July. These figures are separate from the January protest deaths. Published reports did not always classify civilians, members of the armed forces and relatives of officials in the same way.

Therefore, Deaths were also recorded in Israel, Gulf states, US forces and commercial shipping. Changes in US classification of some service deaths complicated comparisons. A final record requires names, date, location, and civilian or combatant status.

Related books on grief: Megan Devine’s It’s OK That You’re Not OK rejects promises of rapid recovery. From Trauma to Healing gives readers language for recognising traumatic reactions. Irvin and Marilyn Yalom’s A Matter of Death and Life approaches mortality and loss through two connected voices.

21. The rial, oil, factories and household purchasing power

In addition, Before the war, sanctions, inflation, electricity shortages and weak investment had already eroded the economy. The free-market dollar rate was reported at about 1.35 million rials on 1 January and 1.72 million on 28 February. After ceasefire fluctuations, it reached roughly 1.941 million on 18 July. Bonbast’s 25 July archive showed about 1.889 million rials. These are open-market reports, not an official central-bank series.

In mid-April, Iran’s official statistics centre reported annual inflation of 53.7 per cent and a year-on-year food-price increase above 115 per cent. Euronews, citing official data, reported annual inflation of about 88.6 per cent for June; the reporting period and the particular index must be preserved when comparing those figures. Before the war, the government provided about 70 million people with monthly food-purchase credit of ten million rials. Currency depreciation reduced its real value. Wartime food packages and electronic credit continued, but unequal access, network disruption and rising prices limited their effect.

For this reason, Factory losses extended beyond bomb damage. Shortages of components, electricity, internet access, insurance and transport stopped production at otherwise intact sites. Reuters documented a small Tabriz factory losing twelve jobs and a downstream chain affecting dozens of factories and thousands of workers. No comprehensive national closure total had been published by 27 July.

Further context

Busy restaurants in part of Tehran can coexist with poverty and recession. Wealth inequality, savings, the psychological need for normality and major differences between cities allow some venues to remain full. A café photograph cannot measure economic health. Real wages, job security, rent, food affordability and production provide stronger indicators.

22. Two nationwide internet shutdowns

Furthermore, Cloudflare recorded two separate nationwide shutdowns in 2026. The first began on 8 January during the protest crackdown. Traffic briefly returned from 21 January and recovered more broadly from 27 January. A second shutdown began with the war on 28 February, pushing traffic below one per cent of earlier levels. Partial restoration began on 26–27 May after 87–88 days; on the first day, most recovered traffic came from Tehran and remained at roughly 40 per cent of the pre-shutdown peak. WhatsApp and many foreign services still required a VPN for much of the population. Starlink, privileged SIM cards and corporate networks gave a limited group alternative access.

Domestic services such as Rubika, Bale, Eitaa and Soroush Plus remained more active on the National Information Network. Their operation did not mean that global internet access existed. Domestic servers, banking and state services could function while independent communication abroad remained blocked.

Moreover, Daily-loss estimates varied sharply. An Iranian deputy communications minister gave a January estimate of US$2.8–4.3 million, while NetBlocks estimated more than US$37 million per day. Wartime reporting said roughly ten million people depended on the digital economy. Digikala laid off 200 people, while many smaller businesses closed without public announcements. VPN costs, malware risk and privileged access created another layer of inequality.

Further context

Related books: Barbara Demick’s Nothing to Envy reconstructs everyday life behind a closed information system. Hyeonseo Lee’s The Girl with Seven Names shows how control of borders, information and family can become instruments of state survival.

23. Hijab, daily resistance and life during war

Therefore, War intensified the security environment but did not erase the social changes that followed 2022. Documentary reporting from Tehran showed women without headscarves in restaurants, shops and streets. Women riding motorcycles became another visible challenge to restriction. The accurate description is diverse clothing and public presence without compulsory hijab; objectifying judgements about how “open” clothing appears do not improve the reporting.

The harsher hijab statute remained suspended, while prosecution, vehicle seizure, summonses, business closure and camera surveillance were still available. Enforcement varied by city and period. Women used the gap between the statute and daily enforcement, while authorities changed pressure according to political conditions.

In addition, Large demonstrations became less frequent under war, arrest and communication controls. Night slogans, memorials, limited strikes, graffiti and dress-based civil disobedience continued. Some people supported foreign strikes as a way to weaken the government. Others opposed the government and rejected bombing the country. A third group prioritised security and territorial integrity. These responses may coexist within one family and may change within one person over time.

24. Constitution, transition and the limits of political claims

The death of a leader, weakening of the IRGC or popularity of an opposition figure does not create a new constitution. Decisions about the form of government, powers and duration of an interim administration, civilian control of armed forces, independent courts, free media, women’s and minority rights, decentralisation, transitional justice and election timing require an open process.

For this reason, Reza Pahlavi and other organisations have presented transition plans. Each should be judged by oversight, time limits, the right to opposition and a credible route to free voting. A dynastic title, foreign support, social-media reach or rally size cannot substitute for votes. Organising under repression still matters; it should prepare political competition rather than pre-empt it.

The current constitution allowed the Assembly of Experts to place Mojtaba Khamenei in office, but restricted candidate competition and the secrecy of the process weakened public legitimacy. A future system could repeat the same concentration of power under a different name.

Furthermore, Related books: Ahmad Kasravi’s History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution records the struggle for parliament, law and limits on arbitrary authority. Akbar Ganji’s The Reality and Image of Khomeini examines the gap between revolutionary promises and the institutions that followed. Timothy Snyder’s On Tyranny offers civic tests that can be applied to the current government and to any proposed successor.

25. Iran on 27 July 2026

Strikes had paused for a second night and Omani mediation was continuing. No final settlement covered Hormuz, the nuclear programme, inspection, sanctions or guarantees against renewed attack. Naval and missile forces remained alert.

Moreover, Ali Khamenei’s death was confirmed. Mojtaba Khamenei was the official supreme leader, without independently verified current audiovisual evidence; reports of his death remained unsubstantiated. Ghalibaf had gained influence, Pezeshkian remained president and the IRGC continued under replacement commanders. The Islamic Republic had suffered a profound shock and continued to govern.

Organised protest was constrained by war, detention and the internet shutdown. Civil disobedience over hijab and economic anger continued. Supporters of the attacks, opponents of war, and people who separated opposition to the government from defence of the country all remained part of Iranian society. No free national survey measured their relative size.

Therefore, The rial was weaker, food more expensive and many factories more fragile. Reopened restaurants, traffic and public ceremonies show people trying to live; they do not establish economic recovery. Water, bridges, ports and internet access will shape Iran’s future as much as missile installations.